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ABSTRACT 
It is important for music educators to have a clear view of what constitutes musical 
knowledge. Education in music is inconceivable unless we believe that something of value 
is transmitted in musical transactions. Indirect, or factual knowledge is a small part of this 
process. It is direct musical knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance, that lies at the heart of 
musical experience. This is only open to us by familiarity with music itself, not in some 
generalised 'aesthetic' manner but within lively and developing artistic traditions. 
Can we begin to understand what anyone might be hearing in this music and 
decide whether it is of any value to take the time to listen? Is music a set of private 
experiences, incommunicable and varying from listener to listener depending on 
individual perceptions and responses, perhaps a sensory pleasure or an opportunity 
for a personal reverie but little more? This is an important question for those who 
work with music and especially for music educators. If musical experience were 
both private and transient, leaving behind in us no trace of its passing it would be 
logically impossible to say that these encounters resulted in us gaining any kind 
of knowledge at all. Music might be thought only to temporarily distract us or to 
change the mood of the moment. If so then nothing of consequence is taken away 
when the music is over, no change of understanding, perspective or attitude, for it 
is this kind of change that is implicit in the concept of 'knowledge'. Knowledge 
is more than just undergoing experience. It suggests the idea of transmission and 
of enduring content. If music is thought of as subjective and private, then 
purposeful teaching is unthinkable and any kind of meaningful student assessment 
is beyond reach. We should forget education: those of us who can should just 
enjoy the fleeting pleasure we may happen to get out of music and let others make 
of it what they can. There would be no point in talking about it or trying to teach it. 
I do not take this view. To some extent, each person does indeed hear music 
somewhat differently, indeed uniquely. But response to music is not entirely 
exclusive to the individual, unshareable, idiosyncratic. If it were so then there 
would be little point in discussing, analysing or putting forward views about 
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music and certainly no sense in making the study of music a compulsory element 
in schools or running courses of study, except to train performers to function in 
the same way that we might train masseurs or car drivers. There would be no 
mutual starting point for conversations about music, no possibility of 
connoisseurship or criticism. There would simply be no point in trying to look for 
the development of musical understanding, for either there would be none or is 
would be hidden from view and therefore inaccessible to education. 
Just as performers' interpretations of musical works can accommodate differing 
inflections of emphasis and musical judgement, so the interpretations of listeners 
may also vary, but there are limits beyond which we would have to say that 
people are not really comprehending the music that they may be playing or to 
which they might be listening For instance, if someone described the last movement 
of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony as being emotionally constricted and generally 
pessimistic in character, made up of timid gestures, although this might tell us 
something about the listener it says nothing about the music as conceived by the 
composer and understood within the traditions from which it springs and to 
which it contributes. There is 'objective' knowledge here somewhere and it can 
be grasped or missed. 
What then is the form this knowledge takes, knowledge which we suspect may 
be gained through musical experience but find so hard to pin down? From the 
start we have to recognise that musical knowledge is multi-levelled, it has several 
strands, often woven together in our actual experience but separable for the 
purpose of closer analysis and understanding. In general, the most obvious and 
easily recognised category of knowledge is sometimes called 'prepositional', 
informational, factual, knowing that. For example we may know that two plus 
seven makes nine or that Manchester is 200 miles from London or that 'a voir' is 
the French verb corresponding with the English 'to have', that Beethoven wrote 
nine symphonies, or where samba or rap originated. It is a mistake to think that 
this is all there is to knowing and in the case of music this error is especially 
obvious. 
Knowledge about music can easily be acquired in non-musical ways, by being 
told or by reading a book. We might in this way acquire knowledge that may have 
historical value but is musically inert. For this reason musicians and teachers 
have to be especially careful to relate factual or prepositional knowledge 
-knowing 'that'- with other strands of musical knowledge. It is possible to 
have quite a precise knowledge about music but this is not the kind of knowledge 
that musicians and music lovers see as being crucially important. 
Gaining information, even useful information, is obviously not the sum of 
musical experience, it is certainly not the essence of musical knowledge. Knowing 
music is clearly much more than processing factual information, knowing 'that'. 
The danger is that factual knowledge may be seen as central to musical knowing. 
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Such knowledge is relatively uncomplicated to manage in classrooms, cheap to 
resource and reasonably easy to assess, very seductive. The possibility of such 
knowledge becoming detached from a genuine musical context, learned verbally 
rather than by musical contact, has always to be resisted. 
A pianist may be busy with the task of deciphering the notation, sorting out the 
chords, organising fingers for the sharps and flats. The ability to decode notation 
(or to write it) is certainly a musical skill which is of importance in some 
traditions, though by no means in all. There are also essential aural judgements 
being made, deciding whether or not what is being played matches the notation, 
the ability to sort out, match, identify and classify sound materials that are the 
basis of music. And most obvious to other people, there is also the facility to 
manage the instrument, to coordinate fingers and articulate keys in a dependable 
controlled way. I would put these 'knowings' in this order of importance; aural 
skills, manipulative control and notational proficiency. Together they form a 
strand of knowledge that we might call 'knowing how'. Unlike propositional or 
factual knowledge, knowing 'how' cannot be displayed verbally, though workshop 
conversations can be helpful in acquiring it; teachers may hope so. 'Knowing 
how' is a type of knowledge that we exhibit in action every day. It is necessary for 
us to know how to do things, to operate a lathe, to spell a word, to translate a 
passage, to ride a bike or drive a car, to use a computer. 
One essential difference between knowing 'that' and knowing 'how' is that 
knowledge of a skill has the potential for leading us very directly into a musical 
encounter. I say 'potential' for it is still possible to get stuck on a skill, for 
example if we choose to roar up and down scales instead of playing pieces or 
analyse chords instead of following the sweep of a jazz or pop improvisation. 
Skills allow us to find our way into music but they can also divert us from musical 
understanding if they become ends in themselves. There are other important 
elements. 
The absolutely central core of knowing in music can be called knowledge 'by 
acquaintance'. This way of putting it draws our atten.tion to the kind of knowledge 
we have of a specific entity, like knowing a person. For instance, we could say 
that we know Renoir's painting, The Rowers' Lunch, or know a particular friend, 
a student or a city. Knowing a person by acquaintance is very different from 
knowing things about a person. It is not just a question of being able to give 
someone's shoe size or their weight - knowing that such and such is so. We might 
call acquaintance knowledge knowing 'this'; knowing this person, this field, this 
symphony, this rock recording. Acquaintance knowledge might to some limited 
extent be demonstrated by propositional statements. If we are able to specify 
someone's size of shoe or waistline measurement the odds are that we might 
know the person pretty well, though not necessarily so. The sales-person working 
in a shoe shop soon gets to know our shoe size but may not get much further in 
knowing us as people with all our individuality. Most acquaintance knowing is 
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indeed likely to be tacit, unanalysed, unarticulated. We may not even have 
thought to notice the actual colour of our friend's eyes, let alone his shoe size, yet 
we undoubtedly have knowledge ofthat person and would, as we say, recognise 
him anywhere. Many writers on aesthetics have stressed acquaintance knowledge 
in the arts as being fundamental. 
My dispositional knowledge of music is not merely general knowledge of fact, knowledge-that. 
It is concrete knowledge-of, of individuals, and added to in fresh experiences, occurrent 
experiences. There is no way of acquiring dispositional knowledge of music except by 
repeated occurrent experiences of it (Reid 1986: 46). 
Some people would go so far as the philosopher of science, Michael Polanyi, 
in insisting that fundamentally 'all knowing is personal knowing - participation 
through indwelling' (Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 44). 
How then does this concrete 'knowledge of' music reveal itself in music 
making? When our pianist is playing, we might notice whether the choice of 
tempo, accentuation or articulation communicates a sense of expressiveness 
unique to the piece, not personal feelings about the music but a perception of how 
this particular music might itself feel. Does the pacing of the performance give 
sufficient time for the chords to make their expressive point yet not be so slow as 
to lose the forward flow that impels the melody? When we speak of expressive 
character we mean that a musical performance has about it a sense of personal 
identity. This individuality may vary with different performers or for different 
audiences but in the case of a notated work this variation of interpretation will be 
within certain limits beyond which we would say that the character of the music 
has been lost, violated or perhaps transformed into something else altogether, as 
when Mozart is given a rock rhythm backing or a theme by Corelli is deconstructed 
by Michael Tippet in his Fantasia for strings. Unless music is perceived as 
expressively characterised the experience is going to be unmemorable, short on 
knowledge. 
There is a second element at work in the personal knowledge of music that 
overarches, complements and is fused with expressive playing, that of structural 
awareness. Are rhythmic and melodic relationships brought out and the phrases 
connected to each other in a meaningful way, the repetitions and contrasts 
brought into a coherent whole? 
To complete this sketch map of musical knowledge we must recognise a 
fourth strand, sometimes called attitudinal, which has been characterised by Bloom 
and others as being the 'affective domain' (Bloom 1964 ). This is not a particularly 
helpful way of looking at knowledge since it sets the 'affective' against the 
cognitive and, as we are seeing, there is a good deal of cognitive work involved in 
sorting out skills and gaining an understanding of musical expression and structure. 
However, it is apparent that we can respond to music with varying levels of 
commitment or none at all. One step up from simply hating the stuff is when we 
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just tolerate certain kinds of music, say opera or rock concerts. If we are 
persuaded by a friend to go along we may only put up with it but otherwise avoid 
the experience like the plague. At the opposite far extreme we might seek out 
opera or rock as a profoundly valued encounter, an experience that is part of the 
very fibre of our lives. A spectrum of degrees of commitment runs between these 
two extremes of negative and positive value attitudes. The development of 
musical valuing stems from such factors as age, gender, social context, personality 
disposition and education, along with the accumulation of previous musical 
experience. This knowledge of 'what's what' is deeply personal, highly subjective 
and varies not only between individuals but for any person over time, perhaps 
fluctuating from day to day. So at one moment I might feel that In the South is 
especially important for me, though in a week or so some other music may have 
taken its place. The young pianist coming to know the D minor Sarabande may 
reach a level of controlled and musically insightful performance but may or may 
not ever feel that this piece is of value for them. To be more certain of the degree 
of valuing we would have to notice whether he or she ever plays it by choice, 
when not asked to do so, perhaps some time later when other works are on the 
agenda. 
Valuing may arise from several sources; perhaps from the sheer pleasure of 
manipulative control itself, or being taken with the way certain phrases speak 
expressively to our inner world of feeling, or the satisfaction of the structural 
organisation drawing the pianist into a perfect world of balance and completion. 
But the ultimate pinnacle is reached when all these elements becon1e fused 
together in moments of revelation, perhaps even having 'intimations of immortality', 
where the correspondence between the musical entity and our inner worlds is 
total. 
Imaginatively we stretch out towards what imagination cannot comprehend. We realise that 
there is more in what we see than meets or can ever meet the inner eye (Warnock 1976: 58). 
When we say we are moved by music what is moving in us are the shadows of 
many previous experiences, perhaps forgotten but fused into a new perspective. 
So profound can this realisation be that we may be led to believe that music is 
indeed so powerfully private and unique that it cannot be spoken about or 
assessed. This is not entirely so. We cannot say everything about music but we 
can certainly share some of our insights with others and it is certainly possible to 
develop critical or analytical judgement, ways of assessing musical experience 
which may deepen the understanding of the musician, the music educator and the 
music lover. 
The possibility of profound value knowledge can exist only because of the 
development of skills and sensitivity with musical materials and the ability to 
identify expressive character and comprehend musical structure. These are neither 
idiosyncratic nor concealed from view and we can find them at work whenever 
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people talk or write about music as critics, articulate connoisseurs. Teachers are 
inevitably in this position. A sensitive teacher or critic can help us to see or hear 
what otherwise might have passed us by. 
These dimensions of discourse about music are at the heart of music education 
and teaching, which is an activity essentially concerned with critical analysis at 
various levels and in different circumstances. 'What would happen if we used a 
cymbal here instead of a gong?' 'What is it that makes that sound so brilliant?' 
'Should this phrase flow quite so confidently forward or be more tentative?' Does 
that piece or performance hold our attention?' These are examples of critical 
questions and some of them can be answered in practical ways, by musical 
experiment or demonstration. 
Though we are able to logically reflect on musical experience, it is important 
to remember that encounters with music begin and end with hearing it 'together' 
and that intuitive knowledge depends as much on sensory data as logical knowledge 
relies on intuitive shaping and selection. Though we need to have some ways of 
talking about music, conceptual discourse starts at the opposite end, away from 
the sensation of sound and our intuitive images that we form in response to sound. 
A danger is that we may come to imagine that analytical knowledge is what 
music is all about and that teachers in particular will tend to work from and 
towards 'concepts', looking for music which exemplifies them. This can easily 
signal that a piece of music is merely an illustration of something else, such as the 
use of certain instruments, the conventions of an historical period or formal 
procedures and not a significant experience on its own account. Surely Beethoven 
did not write the first movement of the Fifth Symphony to illustrate the use of 
'sonata form'. There is a risk of real and worthwhile musical knowledge eluding 
us if teachers and musicians choose to promote, rehearse or present music simply 
because it demonstrates a concept, perhaps that of minor tonality, or mixed 
metres, or opera, or folk song, or a modulation to the dominant. 
To be able to rattle off 'first theme, second theme, closing theme' is a parlour trick not 
worth the trouble of acquiring. To have Beethoven's Third Symphony in one's blood and 
bones is a boon beyond compare: part of our rites of passage, a part of our tribal identity, an 
important part, it seems to me, of what makes us human (Kivy 1991). 
The only justifiable reason for selecting any musical activity as part of an 
educational programme is that it has at least the potential of significant engagement 
at the intuitive level. As education at the end of the twentieth century moves more 
and more towards left brain/right hand values, music and other arts teachers at 
least should keep the intuitive alive. Writing of the discipline of psychology, 
Jerome Bruner sees a deadlock caused by the complexities of traditional analytical 
assumptions and procedures. 
Perhaps the moment is uniquely propitious for the left hand, for a left hand that might tempt 
the right to draw freshly again, as in art school when the task is to find a means of imparting 
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new life to a hand that has become too stiff with technique, too far from the scanning eye 
(Bruner 1962). 
On the other hand (to extend the analogy), the ability to comprehend and 
follow the changing images that constitute the flow of music, requires more than 
mere attention. There has to be a background of previous musical experience that 
permits the identification and discrimination of sonorous relationships, 
comprehension of the conventions of expressive character and an ability to bring 
to the encounter a sense of style and an understanding of the scale in which a 
musical piece functions and sets up a complex set of relationships and sets us 
speculating about what the music may do next. 
Symbolic forms do not develop without traditions, without conventions that 
make thought both possible and shareable. These are precise musical conventions 
though, not general cultural mores. This is why it is important to move from the 
general term 'aesthetic' -intuitive knowledge acquired through sensory 
experience- to the 'artistic' or, in our case, the musical. 
There is always a temptation to surrender the analytical detail of musical 
processes and procedures - the artistic - to the warm intuitive glow of the 
'aesthetic'. Sunsets, light on a wet roof, the smell of cut grass, the feel of silk, the 
smell of pizza, the sound of a band in the park; these are or can be aesthetic if we 
choose to savour and contemplate them each as a unique, special, absorbing 
pleasure; taken through the senses. But every perception arises inevitably in the 
senses. What is different about these aesthetic perceptions? They are moments of 
at-oneness; feeling together with nature, our environment, other people. They 
usually happen without prediction and are not dependent on a reservoir of 
previous experiential knowledge. Of course, a sunset may remind us of the 
paintings of Turner or an ambiguous night sky of a picture by Magritte; if this is 
so then we are enriching the aesthetic with the artistic. 
Our immediate intuitive response is given extra levels of significance by 
layers of previously acquired knowledge; not knowledge about but knowledge of. 
Aesthetic experience is usually an unlooked-for gift and the first sunset may be 
the most powerful sunset experience. Artistic rewards are earned by participation 
in traditions and learned by rubbing up against the artifacts. Unlike the freshness 
of the sunset, we have to work a little and this work is likely to involve coming to 
the work more than once and include an element of analytical sifting as well as 
intuitive gathering; over time and with familiarity we come better to absorb and 
interpret the significance of what is before us. Otherwise art objects and events 
-whether well made or not- just pass us by. Above all, there has to be time and 
opportunity to come to know music by acquaintance, to relate to it, to find 
meaning in the experience. This is where the educator comes in: to open up the 
possibility of direct musical knowledge just a little more and to initiate students 
into the processes of evolving traditions. 
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